In an interesting new op-ed, “Gimme Shelter: The Need For A Contemporary Civil Defense Program,” on the website of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Stanford University professor Lawrence Wein argues that the federal government should immediately start a comprehensive public education campaign about the benefits of sheltering during a nuclear terrorist attack.
Wein along with two graduate students developed a mathematical model of a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device detonated at ground level in the National Mall in Washington at 10 a.m. on a weekday morning (one of the 15 disaster scenarios used by the Department of Homeland Security for its planning purposes).
According to the model, if the public knew when to ’shelter in place’ it could save tens of thousands of lives:
Approximately 80,000 people would die from the immediate effects of the blast and heat and the radiation generated in the first minute. (These numbers are rough estimates and depend upon a number of irreducible factors, including the precise weather conditions.) Additionally, fallout–radioactive material carried by the explosive force and prevailing winds for up to 20 miles–would kill 20,000-40,000 pedestrians (i.e., commuters and residents without access to a vehicle) and 20,000-60,000 people in vehicles. The lower range represents the case in which most people shelter in basements or large buildings (office or residential) for 12-24 hours after the blast; the upper range represents the case in which most people attempt to immediately evacuate (by foot or vehicle).
Of course, as we’ve discussed on the blog including in the previous post, it would be helpful if the public were more informed about dealing with these possibilities — as Americans once were. Wein writes:
…as a society, we have forgotten about the importance of sheltering–a mainstay of Cold War-era civil defense training. This is partly because there isn’t a scientific consensus on the shelter versus evacuation decision. Recommendations range from “evacuate if you can do it quickly” to “everyone shelter-in-place.” Subtler strategies include “shelter unless you’re in an area that will receive a potentially lethal dose of radiation” and “evacuate if your shelter isn’t very good and you can rapidly get away from the plume.
Our analysis suggests that there is only a tiny fraction of people who would be better off by evacuating. And we should note that these people won’t know who they are when the decision about evacuation needs to be made. Accurate plume information–the cloud can be irregularly shaped due to different wind directions at different altitudes–and travel-time estimates won’t be available, and the ability for the government to communicate to those impacted by the attack will be extremely limited, perhaps restricted to battery-powered radios.
Wein contends that even if information and communication were perfect, history indicates that the public compliance on evacuating might be far from it:
Although just 3,500 people within a 5-mile radius of Three Mile Island were told to evacuate when the plant melted down in 1979, 200,000 people within a 25-mile radius actually evacuated. Further, a 2007 survey found that the self-evacuation after a dirty bomb attack would be 65 percent in the absence of government advice and 39 percent if the government advised against evacuation. Moreover, our traffic-flow calculations suggest that even if a small percentage of those who aren’t supposed to evacuate do so anyway, all of the evacuees will be stuck in traffic jams and therefore, exposed to much more radiation, especially because vehicles provide almost no protection from fallout.
Wein argues that the smartest strategy therefore is to advise all citizens to shelter in place in the event of a nuclear explosion.
“To start implementing such a planned response, the government must first relinquish control of consequence management to our citizenry and then initiate an aggressive public-education campaign. The irony is that U.S. government websites currently contain excellent advice–including ‘everyone should shelter’ –but they have neglected to tell people about them. Consequently, Homeland Security needs to get its message out creatively (how about Kiefer Sutherland, a.k.a. Jack Bauer, as the department’s primary spokesman?); simply (”stay indoors for 12-24 hours”); and broadly (ask companies near large cities to have simple sheltering strategies).
The cost for such an educational campaign would surely be less than what we spend on other catastrophic terror threats ($877 million contract for an anthrax vaccine). The bottom line: The public must be educated about this issue now, because it’s a lesson we don’t want to learn from experience.”
As you would imagine, I agree with much of what Wein says in this piece. The fact is that some information on these serious unfamiliar threats can be useful to the public in advance. How best to do it still requires some study and nuance. For example, whether or not it makes sense for their to be a blanket policy for citizens to ’shelter in place’ in a nuclear event might be debated. But I think it is unassailable to tell the public before an incident — whether it be a nuclear bomb or the less potent dirty bomb — what advice they might be hearing from authorities during one.
The full study will appear in the next issue of the journal Risk Analysis.